Colorado Supreme Court – September 2, 2014

The Colorado Supreme Court released no new opinions today. It denied 28 petitions for writ of certiorari. It granted certiorari review in 2 cases, both of which are civil proceedings.

In BP America Production Co. v. Colorado Department of Revenue (No. 13-SC-996), the Court will address:

Whether the court of appeals erred in holding that the phrase “any transportation, manufacturing, and processing costs borne by the taxpayer” in the Colorado oil and gas severance tax statute, section 39-29-102(3)(a), C.R.S. (2013), excludes the cost of the capital that a taxpayer invests in transportation and processing facilities.

In re Marriage of de Koning (No. 14-SC-152) will address:

Whether the court of appeals erred when it reversed the trial court and held that when a dissolution-of-marriage permanent orders hearing is held, and the issue of an award of attorney’s fees pursuant to section 14-10-119, C.R.S. (2013), is not heard until a later date, the court must consider the parties’ financial circumstances as they exist at the date of the later attorney’s fees hearing, and not the date of the permanent orders hearing.

Tenth Circuit – August 5, 2014

On August 5, 2014, the Tenth Circuit issued four published civil opinions.

In Hogan v. Winder, (No. 12-4167), the plaintiff lost his job with Utah Telecommunications Open Infrastructure Agency (UTOPIA), a state agency. The plaintiff alleged that he was terminated after threatening to expose a conflict of interest in contract awards. Then he was the subject of unflattering media articles, one of which was written pseudonymously by the mayor of West Valley City, Utah. The plaintiff sued UTOPIA, West Valley City, the mayor, and a host of other individuals with some perceived connection to the articles for defamation, false light invasion of privacy, intentional infliction of emotional distress,  § 1983, and § 1985 civil conspiracy. The district court dismissed all the claims, and the Tenth Circuit affirmed.

As for the defamation claims, the court concluded that the articles’ statements that the plaintiff was fired for “performance issues” were too nonspecific to be defamatory, references to “erratic behavior” would not be taken at face value by a reasonable reader, and allegations of “extortion” and “blackmail” were “hyperbole and rhetorical flourishes.” The plaintiff’s other tort claims suffered from similar fatal flaws. His § 1983 claim failed because he did not show that the defendants were acting under color of state law, and his § 1985 claim failed to adequately allege a meeting of the minds amongst the defendants who were alleged co-conspirators.

In a 96-page opinion, the Tenth Circuit addressed the consolidated appeal Biodiversity Conservation Alliance v. Jiron, (Nos. 13-1352 and 13-8053) relating to actions taken by the United States Forest Service in the Black Hills National Forest. In the District of Wyoming, Biodiversity petitioned for review of agency action under the Administrative Procedures Act, which the district court denied. Specifically, Biodiversity alleged numerous violations of the National Forest Management Act, the National Environmental Protection Act, and both acts’ regulations. The Tenth Circuit found that the agency’s interpretations of the law were reasonable and the actions not arbitrary and capricious.

After losing in the in the District of Wyoming, Biodiversity moved to enforce a settlement agreement reached in 2000 in litigation involving the Beaver Park area of the Black Hills in the District of Colorado. The district court denied the motion based on the doctrine of laches, and the Tenth Circuit affirmed. The motion mirrored allegations in the Wyoming litigation and in administrative challenges that Biodiveristy had already undertaken. The court noted that the doctrine of laches is disfavored in environmental actions because of the strong public interest involved. Nevertheless, the Tenth Circuit concluded that the district court had not abused in discretion in finding that laches barred the action becuse of Biodiversity’s unreasonable delay and the undue prejudice the Forest Service suffered.

In Cellport Systems, Inc. v. Peiker Acustic GMBH & Co. KG, (Nos. 13-1029 & 13-1046), the court faced a licensing royalty dispute between two companies that develop hands-free cell phone technology. Following a bench trial in the District of Colorado, Peiker challenged the jurisdiction of the Tenth Circuit to hear the appeal because, it argued, Cellport’s right to relief depended on the resolution of a substantial, disputed question of patent law such that the Federal Circuit has exclusive jurisdiction over the case. The Tenth Circuit disagreed, noting that Cellport’s complaint alleged only contract claims, and that the terms of the contract do not require a court to determine whether a patent is valid or has been infringed before awarding royalties – only whether the product at issue falls within the terms of the licensing agreement. Parties can contract to pay royalties even on non-infringing products. Because Cellport’s right to relief on its contract claims thus did not necessarily depend on resolution of a substantial question of federal patent law, the Tenth Circuit retained jurisdiction.

As a result of that jurisdictional analysis, the court concluded that the district court’s decision not to award royalties relating to certain non-infringing products was error, and remanded the case for an award of damages relating to those products. Turning to other merits issues raised by Cellport, the Tenth Circuit affirmed most portions of the judgment and remanded on one issue. It concluded that the district court’s conclusion that the “BT-PSC” technology was not covered by the licensing agreement was not clearly erroneous. The court remanded the case, however, for the district court to determine whether the BT-PSC technology infringed a patent held by Cellport and, if so, to award royalties. With respect to “SIAB” technology, the court affirmed the district court’s findings both that the technology was not covered by the licensing agreement and that the technology does not infringe a patent held by Cellport. The court also considered a challenge to the district court’s decision to apply the statutory prejudgment interest rate, instead of a contractual provision that Cellport argued required interest at a rate of 1.5% per month. The Tenth Circuit agreed with the district court that the contractual provision at issue does not apply to prejudgment interest, and upheld the statutory interest rate. Finally, although the court affirmed the district court’s decision not to award attorneys’ fees in the first instance because neither party could fairly be characterized as “the prevailing party,” it remanded the issue to the district court for reconsideration after altering the judgment in accordance with its decision.

For its part, Peiker appealed the district court’s determination that the license agreement at issue requires “the payment of royalties on any sale of products utilizing Cellport’s patented technology, wherever the products were made, sold or used, so long as any Licensed patent remains in effect.” During the course of the litigation, one of Cellport’s patents had been revoked; Cellport was appealing the decision. On the basis of the revoked patent, however, Peiker asked the district court to remove that patent at issue from the case. The district court recognized that the appeal was pending, but nevertheless ruled on the related contract interpretation. While Peiker appealed the order, Cellport argued that the appeal was not yet ripe. The court agreed the issue was not ripe for appeal, and vacated that part of the judgment interpreting the contract.

In Lenox MacLaren Surgical Corp. v. Medtronic, Inc., (No. 13-1307), the plaintiff was a manufacturer of bone mills — a tool that grinds bone to create small bone particles that are used in spinal-fusion surgery. Lenox asserted claims against several related defendant companies for monopolization and attempted monopolization. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of defendants, but the Tenth Circuit reversed. To prevail on a monopolization claim, Lenox had to prove: (1) monopoly power in the relevant market; (2) willful acquisition or maintenance of this power through exclusionary conduct; and (3) harm to competition. The Tenth Circuit held that genuine issues of material fact existed on all of these issues.

Colorado Court of Appeals – July 17, 2014

The court released two published opinions: People v. Rios, and Castro v. Lintz. The court also released 39 unpublished opinions, denied 6 petitions for rehearing, and released one modified opinion in People v. Schupper.

In Castro v. Lintz, the court considered whether an employer and its individual owner who successfully obtained a Rule 12 dismissal of a former employee’s claims for non-payment of a workers’ compensation award were entitled to an award of attorneys’ fees under Colorado Revised Statutes § 13-17-201. That statute applies to Rule 12(b) dismissals of “all actions brought as a result of a death or an injury to person or property occasioned by the tort of any other person.” The court noted that, in determining whether the statute applies in a particular case, the trial court should focus on the manner in which claims are pleaded.  “When a plaintiff has pleaded both tort and nontort claims, a court must determine, as a matter of law, whether the essence of the action was one in tort, in order to ascertain if section 13-17-201 applies.” The court concluded that, in this case, the trial court had improperly awarded fees under the statute because the “essence” of Castro’s lawsuit was not one sounding in tort.